Six Signs of Scientism

As the English word “scientism” is currently used, it is a trivial verbal truth that scientism—an inappropriately deferential attitude to science—should be avoided. But it is a substantial question when, and why, deference to the sciences is inappropriate or exaggerated. This paper tries to answer that question by articulating “six signs of scientism”: the honorific use of “science” and its cognates; using scientific trappings purely decoratively; preoccupation with demarcation; preoccupation with “scientific method”; looking to the sciences for answers beyond their scope; denying the legitimacy or worth of non-scientific (e.g., legal or literary) inquiry, or of writing poetry or making art

The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth

«Muchas verdades son pronunciadas, para que más puedan ser ocultadas», escribió el magistrado Darling en 1879. Empezando con una articulación de la distinción entre verdad (el fenómeno o concepto) y las verdades (proposiciones verdaderas particulares), este trabajo está en gran parte dedicado a: 1) desarrollar una explicación del doble significado de «parcialmente verdadero» —«verdad-en-parte» vs. «parte de la verdad»—, y 2) entender las razones, y los peligros, de la tendencia muy común a decir sólo parte de la verdad relevante.«Much truth is spoken, that more may be concealed», wrote Mr. Justice Darling in 1879. Opening with an articulation of the distinction between truth (the phenomenon or concept) and truths (particular true propositions), this paper is largely devoted to: 1) developing an account of the dual meaning of «partially true» —«true-in-part» vs. «part of the truth»—; and 2) understanding the reasons for, and the dangers of, the very common tendency to tell only part of the relevant truth

On Logic in the Law: Something, but not All

In 1880, when Oliver Wendell Holmes (later to be a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court) criticized the logical theology of law articulated by Christopher Columbus Langdell (the first Dean of Harvard Law School), neither Holmes nor Langdell was aware of the revolution in logic that had begun, the year before, with Frege\u27s Begriffsschrift. But there is an important element of truth in Holmes\u27s insistence that a legal system cannot be adequately understood as a system of axioms and corollaries ; and this element of truth is not obviated by the more powerful logical techniques that are now available